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Neuroscience Basics for Lawyers
by Oliver I. Goodenough*
and Micaela Tucker
Neuroscience is, without a doubt, one of the "hot" disciplines in
contemporary science. The advances in neuroscience have come from a
cycle of technological and conceptual developments that have led to new
models not only of how we think but also of how thought translates into
behavior. Neuroscience has spawned a number of interdisciplinary
offspring-among them "neurolaw," the application of the insights of
neuroscience to problems of law and vice versa.' The Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law Symposium from which this volume
of the Mercer Law Review has emerged is but one manifestation of a
rapidly increasing interest in neurolaw.
As a prelude to diving into the discussions-and sometimes debates-that a neurolaw approach provokes in legal scholarship, a reader
should have at least an introductory understanding of the brain and of
the tools and models that make up the cognitive revolution. This Article
is intended to provide just such an introduction. Those who wish to
follow up with additional study have a flood of resources at their
disposal. These range from popular works' to short scholarly treatments' and on to more challenging, graduate-level compendiums.'

* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. Faculty Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet
& Society, Harvard Law School. Harvard College (BA, magna cum laude, 1975);
University of Pennsylvania (J.D., cum laude, 1978). Member, State Bars of New York and
Pennsylvania (inactive).
** Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Vermont, Montpelier.
Rice University (BA, with honors, 1994); Vermont Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2009).
Member, State Bar of Vermont.
1. See Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive Neuroscience, 6
ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 61 (2010).
2. See, e.g., SANDRA AAMODT & SAM WANG, WELCOME 'lo YOUR BRAIN: WHY You LOSE
YoUR CAR KEYS BUT NEVER FORGET How TO DRIVE AND OTHER PUZZLES OF EVERYDAY
LIFE (2009); RITA CARTER ET AL., THE HUMAN BRAIN BOOK (1st American ed. 2009).

3.

See, e.g., Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to

Normative Judgment in Law and Justice, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. Soc. LOND. B. 1709 (2004);
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Undergraduate texts can serve as very useful entry-level guides,' and
there are many online resources as well.6 Most of the information set
out in this Article can and should be sourced authoritatively to these and
similar works rather than to this introductory Article.'
I.

TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Neurolaw has been made possible as a field of study by the technological advances that have fueled cognitive neuroscience more generally.
Until relatively recently, science was largely unable to study the actual
workings of the brain while the brain engaged in thought and guided
behavior. Getting inside the skull of a living person was a near
impossibility. For some years, psychology focused on behavior-the
outward manifestation of a mental process.' To the extent that the
underlying processes were considered, the discussion was based on a
certain amount of self-reporting and internal reflection. The impenetrability of the mental "black box" was not fully complete, however. Lesion
cases, such as those involving injuries from strokes, war wounds, or
industrial accidents like the famous Phineas Gage case, provided some

Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imagingfor Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009
STAN. TECH. L. REV 5.; Paul J. Zak, Neuroeconomics, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. Soc. LOND. B.
1737 (2004).
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES (4th ed. 2009);
HUMAN BRAIN FUNCTION (Richard S. J. Frackowiak et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004).
5. See, e.g., BERNARD J. BAARS & NICOLE M. GAGE, COGNITION, BRAIN, AND
CONSCIOUSNESS: INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIvE NEUROSCIENCE (2d ed. 2010); MICHAEL S.
GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND (3d ed. 2009).

6. The website of the Law and Neuroscience Project at www.lawneuro.org and its
bibliographic resource at www.lawneuro.org/Resources/Bibliography.aspx are good starting
points for an explanation of neurolaw. At the scholarly level, the Interdisciplinary
Research Centre for Neurosciences of the Johannes Gutenberg-University of Mainz has
compiled an extensive online bibliography of neuroethics, http://www.1inguistik.
unimainz.de/schlesewsky/publications, that includes many sources relating to neuroscience
and law. A bibliography aimed at law and the biological sciences more generally is
available at http://law.vanderbilt.edu/seal/resources.htm.
7. A reasonable compendium of neurolaw scholarship can be found in Goodenough &
Tucker, supra note 1. At the risk of leaving good work unmentioned, the following
compendium volumes provide concentrated doses of work at the intersection of law,
morality, and neuroscience: LAw AND THE BRAIN (Semir Zeki & Oliver R. Goodenough eds.,
2006); LAW, MIND AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009); 2
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed.,
2008); NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (Brent
Garland ed., 2004); THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW (Nita A.

Farahany ed., 2009).
8. See B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1953); JOHN B. WATSON,
BEHAVIORISM (Norton 1924).
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information about anatomical function.9 The limits, however, on what
could be known about living brain processes in humans made behaviorism a reasonable and often fruitful approach.
Over the past two decades, this picture has changed radically. Science
has discovered progressively more sensitive and powerful techniques for
investigating the electrical, neurochemical, and metabolic correlates of
brain function linked to particular kinds of thoughts, tasks, and
behaviors. The black box of the brain became amenable to study after
all, and the results have been spectacular.
Early technologies for capturing data on the processes of thought
included various kinds of external electrical measurements. Some
external electrical measurements-such as galvanic skin conductance-measure systemic electrical properties across wide swaths of the body.
Other measurements-like electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG)-provide information on patterns of electrical
activity within the brain. These measures are quite precise as to the
timing of activity; they are much less successful at providing localization
information.
II.

NEUROIMAGING

The most widely recognized breakthroughs have involved scanning
techniques known collectively as neuroimaging. These technologies look
for an attribute or by-product of some brain function-often linked to
heightened metabolism in an active area-which can be detected by a
targeted external mechanism, even when located deep in the brain.
Directional measurements-often referred to as "slices"-are made and
then subjected to complex mathematical processing called tomography,
resulting in a reliable mapping of the distribution of the selected
attribute onto the brain. When these measurements are captured and
paired with the mental activity and behavior stimulated by specific
experimental tasks and stimuli, neuroimaging can create increasingly
useful models of the workings of thought.
Early on, positron emission tomography (PET) scans played an
important role. In this technique, a short-lived radioactive isotope is
bound into a targeted molecule. A dose of this combination is injected

9. See, e.g., ANTONIO R, DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN (1994); LAWRENCE WEISKRANTZ, BLINDSIGHT: A CASE STUDY AND
IMPLICATIONS (1986); John M. Harlow, Passageof an Iron Bar Through the Head, 39 B.
MED. SURGICAL J. 389 (1848); Roger W. Sperry, Hemisphere Deconnection and Unity in
Conscious Awareness, 23 AM. PSYCHOL. 723 (1968); Reading about Phineas Gage, DEAKN
UNIVERSITY (last updated Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.deakin.edu.au/hnbs/psychology/ga
gepage/PgRead.php.
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into the bloodstream of the subject, and its decay provides a measurable
tracer for the differential distribution of the target molecule in the body.
In traditional PET approaches to brain scanning, oxygen and glucose-both are associated with metabolism in the brain-were often used
as the basis for the tracer. By establishing the location of heightened
metabolism during a particular mental task, we can infer that the
location is doing some of the work involved in the targeted cognition. A
lowered metabolism can suggest that activity in the area is in some way
inhibited in the performance of the task.
PET has limitations of spatial resolution and temporal sensitivity, and
its use of injected radioactivity restricts the number of times an
individual can be an experimental subject. In recent years, much of the
functional scanning activity has shifted over to the fMRI technique,
which utilizes a different proxy for metabolism. PET has had some
resurgence, however, as science has developed tagging agents that
interact with specific types of neuroreceptors associated with one or more
of the messenger neurochemicals that are a key element in brain
processes.10 This research is expanding our knowledge of brain
function beyond metabolism, providing information on the intersection
of location and chemistry with great importance for untangling problems
such as addiction.n
The fMRI scanl2 is probably the most widely used tool in contemporary cognitive neuroscience." Here, the scan induces a magnetic field
in the components of the body and then records how it decays.
Differential patterns in this decay help to pinpoint anatomical differences in the targeted tissue, which can include joints and organs as well as
the brain. Scans of the brain can be either "anatomical" -showing
physical structures-or "functional"-showing areas of increased or
lowered blood flow that can be associated with functional activity. The
spatial resolution of MRI is continuously improving, and the detail
available in a careful anatomical scan is quite remarkable. Functional

10. Alex K. Converse et al., PET MeasurementofrCBFinthe Presence ofaNeurochemical Tracer, 132 J. NEUROSCI. METHODS 199, 199-207 (2004).
11. See Wynne K. Schiffer et al., Imaging Addiction with PET: Is Insight in Sight?, 10
DRUG DiscovERY TODAY 547 (2005).
12. "MRI" stands for "magnetic resonance imaging."

The "f" in fMRI indicates a

functional approach.
13. See, e.g., Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the
Admissibility and PersuasivenessoffMRI, in LAw, MIND AND BRAIN, supra note 7; John C.

Gore, Principles and Practiceof Functional MRI of the Human Brain, 112 J. CLINICAL
INVESTIGATION 4 (2003); Jones et al., supra note 3.
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scans focus in on the "BOLD" response,14 tracking the increase in the
presence of oxygenated blood that follows shortly after increased activity
in a particularly active area of the brain. This is, once again, an
indicator linked to metabolism, which can be used as an indication of
activity with reasonable reliability. Because function is measured over
short scanning periods, spatial resolution remains a challenge.
The data produced in an fMRI scan, or any form of tomography for
that matter, comes out not as a picture like a photograph but rather as
a very large set of readings of relatively small variations in signal
strength that must be assembled through a time and computer resourceconsuming process. This analysis eventually builds a three-dimensional
map of metabolic variation across the scanned regions. These results
can then be represented in a pictorial form, often made to look like a
kind of direct representation of a human brain. Most often, some
illustration of the zone of BOLD signal increase-or decrease-will be
plotted onto a model of the brain and is frequently depicted as a spot of
bright color. This convention has led to the fundamentally inaccurate
but still widely used expression that the activity has made a part of the
brain "light up" in the scanner. However vivid the representation of the
spot on the brain in the scientist's report, nothing has actually illuminated in the brain." It would be more accurate to say instead that the
brain apparently has been more (or less) activated or has done more (or
less) work in this region during the activity.
III.

DATA ANALYSIs

The end result in the normal imaging study is not a picture of the
entire brain at work. To begin with, studies typically focus on a single
area of interest. The medical function of MRIs, from which the research
has grown, usually targets a "problem area," seeking information that
may lead to a diagnosis or treatment. By looking at a limited area of
interest, the researcher can limit the size of the data-set subject to the
exceptionally complex processing necessary for good tomography and
analysis.

14.

The commonest method of fMRI is blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD)
imaging, which has dominated this field since its discovery. BOLD fMRI employs
heamoglobin as a convenient endogenous contrast agent, relying on the
magnetization difference between oxy- and deoxyhaemoglobin to create the fMRI
signal.
Owen J. Arthurs & Simon Boniface, How Well do We Understandthe Neural Originsof the
fMRI BOLD Signal? 25 TRENDS IN NEUROSCI. 1 (2002) (citations omitted).
15. Jones et al., supra note 3,
34-35.
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Most forms of functional imaging rely on "subtraction analysis." The
idea of finding areas of increased metabolism necessitates a comparison
to some activity state for those areas for which there is a lower level of
metabolism. In many experimental designs, the targeted mental task is
paired with a closely related one that differs only in a carefully
controlled element. By subtracting the readings for the baseline task
from those of the targeted task, differences in function are highlighted.
Because the effects can be quite small and idiosyncratic in any
particular individual, the readings are often cumulated across a number
of trials and a number of individuals, often involving a pool of twelve or
more subjects to achieve statistically significant effects. Thus, the pretty
pictures of activation regions frequently relate to an average among
many subjects rather than to the pattern of anyone in particular. 6 In
fact, even in a good study, it is possible that none of the subjects has a
pattern of activity that corresponds completely to all of the locations
reported as statistically implicated for the task in question.
A further caution to be applied is that subtraction only highlights the
anatomy not shared by the target and comparison tasks. Shared
structures and networks, which may be very important for understanding what is happening, will drop out in the comparison. Identifying
these overlaps will require different comparison tasks and different
subtractions; this is a relatively laborious process, but it is a process that
is keeping neuroscientists employed productively around the world, and
it is producing better and better models of our cognitive processes.
While subject to important limitations and cautions, cumulatively these
technological developments constitute a tremendous leap forward. New
research is exploring a technique called resting-state analysis that can
circumvent some of the limits of the subtraction method and that
provides improved insights on the network properties of brain activity.
This approach looks not at isolated mental tasks, but rather at the
networks of brain regions that interact with each other, determined in
this case by tracking interactions that occur naturally in the "resting"
brain. This method of analysis will open new doors for research of
interest to law and neuroscience."

16. Id. at app., cmt. A25.
17. See, e.g., M.P. van den Heuvel & H.E. HulshoffPol, Exploring the Brain Network:
A Review on Resting-StatefMRI FunctionalConnectivity, 20 EUR NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOL. 519-34 (2010), available at http-//www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmet20471808; M.D.
Greicius et al., Functional Connectivity in the Resting Brain: A Network Analysis of the
Default Mode Hypothesis, 100 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC 253-58 (2003).
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IV. BRAIN BAsIcs I: MIcRosTRucTuRE
So what are we looking at with all of this new technology? At the
level of microstructure, the most important cellular building-block in the
brain is the neuron. This specialized cell comes in many configurations.
At its most typical, the shape of a neuron is analogous to a tree (indeed,
the growth in its outer portions is called "arborization"). The neuron
consists of a central body-a soma-with a number of
shoots-dendrites-reaching out in a branching pattern to connect with
other neurons. While specialized in its function, the soma nonetheless
contains many of the same organelles as other cells. On opposite sides
of the soma-sometimes referred to as "above" and "below" the soma,
evoking the tree metaphor-are the branching dendrites and the trunklike axon. The dendrites are tendril-like receptors while the long,
usually singular, axons are the outward-facing conductors of communication through the release of neurotransmitters.
Neurons send and receive electrical impulses along the network of
connections in an idiosyncratic way. Most neurons use electricity to
operate internally but use chemistry to communicate with each other.
Neurons are generally not in direct contact. Rather, between the
communicating axon of one neuron and the receiving membrane of
another is a very small space called a synapse, a distance of between
twenty and forty nanometers. Communication between neurons across
the synaptic gap-or cleft-occurs through an electrochemical process that
is accomplished by releasing neurotransmitters-little molecular
messengers-on one side and collecting the neurotransmitters on the
other side. To describe the process simply, the axon is responsible for
releasing any one of several neurotransmitting chemicals, which are
bound to special molecules, into the synaptic gap. The transmitting
molecules then diffuse and may bind with receptor proteins on the
receiving-or postsynaptic-neuron.
When neurotransmitters hit the receptors of the postsynaptic neuron
in sufficient quantity, they cause excitement in the target cell, which can
be reinforced by messages from other sending neurons in the target's
network. When the target cell achieves a sufficiently excited state, it
"fires," releasing neurotransmitters in its own turn and sending a
message of excitement to further neurons attached in its network. If,
however, the transmission does not raise the receiving cell's electric
potential beyond a certain threshold, the transmission fails. This
function is an "all or nothing" phenomenon. Once the released
neurotransmitters have delivered their message, the frugal processes of
the brain work to absorb many of the neurotransmitters back up into
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their reservoirs for use in the next interchange-a process called
reuptake.
Neurotransmitters come in a number of varieties, including such
familiar names as dopamine, adrenaline, and serotonin. Research is
showing that various structures in the brain have concentrations of
neurons with greater or lesser involvement with the different neurotransmitters. The background levels of these chemicals can modulate
the strength necessary to send a convincing message across the synapse.
Prozac, for instance, is one of a class of drugs called serotonin reuptake
inhibitors. By blocking reuptake, the supply of that transmitter in the
synapse remains elevated, and the strength of any signal sent using
serotonin is reinforced. Opiates, cocaine, and other addictive drugs often
have a significant impact on the dopamine system. This impact includes
stimulating the learning circuits in the brain, literally teaching the user
through his natural processes of instruction that the drug is something
positive to be sought out as a major life priority."
Neuroscientists would like to be able to measure the activity of
particular neurons as the brain works, and this is sometimes possible.
Neuron measurement requires using very precise instruments that are
generally applied to or implanted in an exposed brain. While animal
studies can permit the implants that allow such precise measurements
over a prolonged period, in humans this kind of research is typically
limited to patients during surgery. Scanning is not yet able to isolate
individual cells; even the most precise scanning methods measure
clusters of many thousands of neurons.
V. BRAIN BASICS II: MACROSTRUCTURE
At a somewhat higher level of structure, neurons are connected in
networks, both locally and across the brain. The functions of the brain
are allocated differentially to overlapping groups of these networks.
Some areas, such as those involved in primary visual processing, are
quite specific in what they do; others, such as those involved in internal
attention monitoring, are recruited as components in a number of
different mental tasks. Obtaining a more complete understanding of the
structural functionality within the brain is a central goal for cognitive
neuroscience. While this study is still very much a work in progress, the
picture becomes clearer every day.

18. Steven E. Hyman, The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for Voluntary
Control of Behavior, 7 Am. J. BIoETH. 8, 10 (2007); Steven E. Hyman, et al., Neural
Mechanisms ofAddiction: The Role ofReward-RelatedLearningandMemory, 29 ANN. REv.
NEuRoscI. 565, 568, 572 (2006).
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At the level of macrostructure, the brain is generally divided into a
few large features. The naming of these features is a confusing mix of
old medical Latin along with more modem names for particular regions
and areas. Brodmann's system of identification, introduced in 1909,
suggested approximately fifty-two regions of the brain." There are also
systems of numbered coordinates. Mastering all of these variations is
not necessary for making a start in neurolaw but a working familiarity
with several of the most important features probably is.
Perhaps the most prominent feature in brain anatomy is its outer
layer, the cortex. The name comes from a Latin root meaning "bark,"
and as bark does, the cortex forms a highly wrinkled surface that wraps
around other principal brain structures. Like many brain features, the
cortex has a left and right hemispherical division. Each of these
hemispheres has four large regions or "lobes"-the frontal, temporal,
parietal, and occipital-working roughly from front to back in the head.
While many processes are distributed across several regions, some
gross level associations can be made between these lobes and particular
functions. For instance, much of the processing of visual information is
performed in the occipital lobe. The parietal lobe is significantly
involved in receiving and processing information about touch, pain,
temperature, and limb position. Much of our hearing and auditory
processing occurs in the temporal lobe. The frontal lobe plays many
roles, including directing movements in the sub-area called the motor
cortex and planning and executing behaviors of many kinds in the subarea called the prefrontal cortex. Indeed, this prefrontal area is
implicated in many law-salient functions, including social monitoring,
inhibition, and self-control. The prefrontal cortex comes up frequently
in discussions of law and neuroscience.
Underneath the cortical layer is a further set of structures-the limbic
system.
The limbic system's components include the thalamus,
amygdala, hypothalamus, and hippocampus. This system is implicated
in a number of important functions, ranging from quick "fight or flight"
style processing of sensory input by the hypothalamus, short and longterm memory formation by the hippocampus, and emotional reaction and
regulation in the amygdala.o The limbic system can be viewed partly
as a separate system, but the limbic system also interacts with the
cortex in important ways.

19. Korbinian Brodmann, Vergleichende Lokalisationslehreder Grosshirnrindein ihren
Prinzipien dargestelit auf Grund des Zellenbaues, in SOME PAPERS ON THE CEREBRAL
CORTEx 201, 201-30 (Gerhardt von Bonin ed., Charles C. Thomas 1960) (1909).

20. Abigail A. Baird, The Developmental Neuroscience of Criminal Behavior, in THE
IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 7, at 81, 85-87.
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Focusing on the separate aspects of limbic system function, some
scientists have spoken of a two-track system in the brain, what LeDoux
Economists Kahneman and
calls the "high road" and "low road."
Frederick also argue for a "dual-process model," although it is less
concretely tied to the cortex and limbic anatomical divide. The essence
of a dual-process model is that judgments can be produced in two ways
(and in various mixtures of the two): a rapid, associative, automatic, and
effortless intuitive process (System 1), and a slower, rule-governed,
deliberate and effortful process (System 2). System 2 "knows" some of
the rules that intuitive reasoning is prone to violate and sometimes
intervenes to correct or replace erroneous intuitive judgments. Thus,
errors of intuition occur when two conditions are satisfied: System 1
generates the error and System 2 fails to correct.22 While this kind of
separation corresponds to our folk psychological understandings-particularly in Western, rationalist societies-the relationship
between the cortex system and limbic system is probably more complex
and interactive than this somewhat simple model would suggest.
The final anatomical division of the brain is the brainstem. This area
at the bottom and rear of the brain provides links from the brain to the
rest of the body via the spinal cord. The brainstem is responsible for a
number of important regulatory functions, including arousal, alertness,
breathing, blood pressure, and heartbeat. The brainstem's relevance to
law and neuroscience is most obvious in questions of end-of-life" and
brain death, as in the famous case of Terri Schiavo.'
VI.

MODELING COGNITIVE PROCESSES

Cognitive neuroscience takes the physiological understanding as its
starting point, and by tracing the electrical, metabolic, and neurochemical correlates in the physiology linked to particular mental tasks and
behavioral outcomes, cognitive neuroscience has produced new models
of human thought and action. Cognitive neuroscience has also given us

21. JOSEPH LEDoux, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF
EMOTIONAL Lin 161-63 (1996).
22. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 (2002).

23. See, e.g., Robin Mackenzie, Reframingthe Good Death:EnhancingChoice in Dying,
Neuroscience, End-of-Life Research and the Potentialof Psychedelicsin PalliativeCare,in
LAW, MIND AND BRAIN, supra note 7, at 239.
24. See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill, Terri Schiavo-A Tragedy Compounded, 352 NEW. ENG.
J. MED. 1630 (2005).
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a coveted first glimpse into the building blocks of personality, abnormality, and mental illness.
At least in part, the new model has undone the Cartesian view of a
unified intelligence. Descartes postulated a unitary center of thought
that was largely separated from the brain itself and that communicated
A similar conception is
with the brain via the pituitary gland.'
widespread in folk psychology and is sometimes expressed in the idea of
the homunculus captain-a little human in the center of all our thought
and will, ordering the mind and body about like the captain of a ship.
The captain may not always be heard by the unruly crew at her
command, but our folk psychology presumes that she is there nonetheless. Freud and others in his time made important suggestions about
the more fragmented nature of thought, motivation, and action, but
Freud also proposed a hierarchical system in the id, ego, and superego
(the "captain" again?), and he lacked a solid physiological basis for his
necessarily speculative modeling.26 Indeed, the somewhat primitive
exculpatory argument that "my brain made me do it"-rightly condemned
by Morse"-depends on a kind of fusion of Cartesian and Freudian
thinking applied to a cartoon notion of neuroscience: the well-intentioned
homunculus captain once again overruled, this time by a "crew" that is
manifest in the recalcitrant mechanisms of the brain. Good neuroscience
should have no time for such an argument: the processes that create
what we inadequately describe as captain and crew are all products of
brain function, and a theory of decision making, action, and responsibility grounded in neuroscience must take them all into account.
Behaviorism held sway over much of psychology in the mid-twentieth
century. At its best, behaviorist psychology recognized that the available
models of cognition were inadequate in part because there was such a
limited ability in the science of the time to investigate brain function in
living humans. The brain was important, but it was a "black box," an
organ whose workings were necessarily secret. Thus, behaviorism
focused on what a study of action could tell us about the nature of the
thought that produced it, often with significant results. At its worst,
however, behavioral psychology came to believe that opening up the
black box would be irrelevant-or even a threat-to good research.28
This fundamentalist approach, together with a certain bumptious

25. See DAMASIO, supra note 9, at 118-19.
26. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID (Ernest Jones ed., Joan Riviere trans.,

4th ed. 1947).
27. See Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and CriminalResponsibility:A
DiagnosticNote, 3 OHIO ST. J. ClIM. L. 397 (2006).
28. See id. at 402.
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assertiveness on the part of those pushing the new cognitive-or thoughtbased-approaches, sometimes created barriers to the productive
integration of behavioral and cognitive work. Luckily, these barriers
appear to be eroding rapidly as the neuroscientific approaches bear
undeniable fruit.
The new models of thought now emerging have moved decisively away
from a unitary, undifferentiated model of thought and have also
departed from physical and mental dualism along the Cartesian lines."
Rather, thought is seen as the outcome of a distributed, organic process
within the brain. Thought is a "computational" process that is physically carried out through the interaction of neurons. This process is highly
complex, but it is nonetheless susceptible to scientific study and
modeling. Investigating the active biology of mental work will give
insights into the processes of thought and behavior. Taking this
functionalist approach, when looking at mental activity, we may first
ask, "What problem is the brain solving?" The key step in cognitive
neuroscience is the expectation that the approach taken by the the
individual's mind in solving the problem will be physically present in the
workings of her brain. By investigating this physical presence, we can
in turn gain insights into the types of solutions available to humans and
the cues that switch us into a particular approach. These insights will
sometimes confirm the folk psychology embodied in our laws, though
they will also often expose details and subtleties missed in our less
sophisticated formulations. At other times, these insights will challenge
our traditional beliefs about mental processes and may stimulate
fundamental changes in how law is framed and applied.
VII.

THE ExAMPLE OF EMoTION

Emerging work on the cluster of mental processes that we group under
the label of "emotion" is a good example of how the new models of
thought can bring new insights to old problems. Emotion is a word that
in its traditional usage gathers a number of mental processes and
experiences together under a single label, and neuroscience helps us to
make some useful differentiations. To begin with, we can separate the
sensation of arousal that we monitor in ourselves and others-the
sensation we label "emotion"-from the functional mental processes that
give rise to the sensation.ao
Neuroscience suggests that at a functional level, the processes we label
as emotion act as a kind of emphasizer and highlighter in the brain, an

29.

DAMASIO, supra note 9, at 250-51.

30.

Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 3, at 1717.
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indicator of importance and urgency."1 Emotional states direct our
attention; our cognition gravitates towards phenomena that have
emotional valance." In the realm of memory, events that are accompanied by emotional states are more likely to be transferred from working
This transfer, however, is no
memory to long-term recollection.'
guarantee of accuracy; work by Phelps and Sharot has demonstrated
that the feeling of certitude that comes with memories formed in an
emotional context-like our memories of the events of September 11,
2001-is not justified by greater accuracy in such memories.'
Recognizing the functionality of emotion allows us to understand its
place in law. Richard Posner, a rationalist who sees some role for
emotion in moral and legal judgment, described the traditional suspicion
of emotion in legal studies: "The law itself is conventionally regarded as
a bastion of 'reason' conceived of as the antithesis of emotion, as
operating to rein in the emotionality of the behavior that gives rise to
legal disputes."
We now understand, however, that without emotional content, much
of the motivational force of normative judgment would be missing."
Cass Sunstein has noted the importance of indignation and "moral
outrage" as a motivator in the decisions of juries and of legislative
decisions.3 ' Emotions may also act as guarantors of moral commitments, both in ourselves and in our judgments of others. 8 Emotions
are often a necessary part of competent thought, particularly thought
that will lead to action. On the other hand, rationalists have a point:
31. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 20; J. Morris & R. Dolan, FunctionalNeuroanatomy of
Human Emotion, in HUMAN BRAIN FUNCTION, supra note 4, at 365, 365-88; R.J. Dolan,
Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior, 298 SCIENCE 1191 (2002).
32. Adam K Anderson & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Lesions of the Human Amygdala Impair
Enhanced Perception of Emotionally Salient Events, 411 NATURE 305, 307-08 (2001).
33. See Morris & Dolan, supra note 31, at 365-88.
34. Elizabeth A. Phelps & Tali Sharot, How (and Why) Emotion Enhances the
Subjective Sense ofRecollection, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Sc. 147, 147 (2008).
35. Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalismin Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW
309 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
36. See FREUD, supranote 26; LAW, MIND AND BRAIN, supra note 7; Posner, supra note
34; Oliver R. Goodenough, Institutions, Emotions, and Law: A Goldilocks Problem for
Mechanism Design, 33 VT. L. REV. 395, 395-404 (2009); Goodenough & Prehn, supra note
3.
37. Cass R. Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral Indignationon Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 405,
428 (2009).
38. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS (1988); Robert H. Frank, Cooperation Through Emotional Commitment, in
EVOLUTION AND THE CAPACITY FOR COMMITMENT (Randolph M. Neese ed., 2001); Robert

H. Frank, The Status of Moral Emotions in ConsequentialistMoral Reasoning, in MORAL
MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 42 (2008).
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emotion-driven reactions can drive us to responses that are not
productive in the long run, a classic "Goldilocks problem" for the law."9
Scholarship by Terry Maroney is helping to further delineate the role of
emotion in particular legal problems and processes.o
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

As the example of emotion shows, the new models of thought arising
out of cognitive neuroscience can help us to resolve questions in law that
have proved hard for traditional psychology and the other social sciences
to resolve. The enriched psychology that cognitive approaches make
possible is a particularly useful tool in seeking to understand topics
when current approaches of law, folk psychology, and traditional
academic psychology are not delivering satisfactory results for society.
This summary can only begin the process of introducing practitioners
and legal scholars to the richness of the knowledge emerging from
neuroscience, but even an entry-level understanding can provide
intellectual access to the advances-and perhaps steps sideways and even
backwards-provided by neurolaw.

39. Goodenough, supra note 36, at 402.
40. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as ConstitutionalLaw, 62
VAND. L. REV. 851 (2009); Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of
an Emerging Field, 30 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 119 (2006).

